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Introduction
The Karen Quinlan case has resurfaced a discussion of the concepts
of ordinary and extraordinary means of preserving life as they have
been understood and developed by Catholic theologians over the
years. In this study, I would like to outline that understanding and
development as they appeared before this celebrated case, so that we can
see ethical methodology at work, free from the emotion and personal
involvement which often surrounds such a sensitive issue. I will divide
my presentation into two parts: 1) Catholic teaching before the papal
allocution of Pius XII to physicians and anesthetists on Nov. 24, 1957 ;
and 2) the papal allocution itself and responses of Catholic theologians
to it. I will close with a discussion of some of the more pertinent
issues as I see them.
Catholic Teaching Before the Papal Allocution
In an article published in 1958 1 (but written before the papal allocution), Jose Janini presents a very concise history of the development
of the co ncepts of the ordinary and extraordinary means for preserving life , especially as these concepts are applied to surgical operations. He points out that in the 16th century, when the doctrine began
August , 1980

215

to be formed, the development of anesthesia and antisepsis was at
such a primitive level as to render almost every surgical operation an
excruciating ordeal both subjectively (pain) and objectively (disfigurement) .2 In fact, surgical operations were not infrequently compared
with torture chambers. 3
It was in this context that Soto in 1582 first pointed out that
superiors could oblige their subjects under religious obedience to use
medicine that could be taken without too much difficulty (com mode), but that they could not oblige them to undergo excruciating
pain because nobody is held to preserve life by such means. 4 It was
Banez, however, in 1595, who introduced the terms "ordinary" and
"extraordinary " into the discussion of the preservation of life. He
points out that while it is reasonable to hold that a human being must
conserve his or her life, one is not bound to employ extraordinary
means, but only to preserve life by nourishment and clothing common
to all, by medicine common to all, and even through some ordinary
and common pain or anguish (dolorem), but not through any extraordinary or horrible pain or anguish, nor by any undertakings
(sumptos) extraordinarily disproportionate to one's state in life. 5
Janini concludes his first section by pointing out that through the
18th century the classical moralists held the following points:
1. One has the obligation to undergo a surgical operation in order to
protect one's life, when the pain or anguish (dolores) is negligible
(exiguos), common, and ordinary.
2. Nothing is demanded which would be the occasion for agonizing,
horrible, or extraordinary pain or anguish .
3. One is able to oblige by obedience, in spite of extraordinary pain,
in some circumstances (he mentions three specific cases of this).
4. Outside of those cases in which one can impose obedience, it is
necessary to get the permission of the patient in order to operate,
because one is one's own master when it comes to parts (membrorum) of one's own body.6

Janini begins his next section by pointing out that medical science
of the 19th and 20th centuries, especially with its discoveries of antisepsis and anesthesia, has profoundly altered the situation in which
the classical moralists wrote . He then discusses the approaches of
moralists during those years.
In the first place, he points out that Palmieri leaves to others the
task of deciding whether a surgical amputation is obligatory or not.
Noldin concludes that it is, especially since there now exists the possibility of attaching artificial limbs, and one has the obligation of preserving life even with some bodily defect. Lehmkuhl expressly recognizes that in his time a surgical operation, under the aspect of pain
(dolor), cannot be considered as an extraordinary means . However,
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Lehmkuhl makes a distinction between pain and horror, and maintains
that one need not be bound to undergo an operation that one views
with a great deal of repulsion (horrorem magnum), even though there
may not be any actual pain involved. 7
Janini then presents the position of Pruemmer who maintains that
any surgical operation which is extremely painful or burdensome, such
as the amputation of both arms, should be considered an extraordinary means. He also mentions Merkelbach who introduces a utilitarian calculus. He concludes this section by mentioning the opinion
of Bender that to undergo a surgical operation of sufficient gravity
that it would be considered an extraordinary means by moralists is not
strictly obligatory to save one's life or regain one's bodily health as
long as one's own life does not carry with it a relevant familial or
social concern. 8
In the final section Janini concludes that in the light of present surgical techniques, modern surgery must always be considered an ordinary means, at least as this term was understood by the classical
moralists. However, he maintains that one must always consider other
relevant circumstances (e.g., horror, uncertainty of success, etc.) as
well as other virtues that may be involved (piety, charity), before one
can pass a moral judgment on any given case. 9
A much more thorough history and analysis of the doctrine of
ordinary and extraordinary means was also published in 1958 by
Daniel A. Cronin (this work was also written before the papal allocution, however»)O Some of Cronin's more significant conclusions are
the following:
1. All are obliged to preserve their lives unless a moral impossibility

would excuse (any means involving a moral impossibility are
extraordinary means).
2. There is a distinction between natural (those per se intended by
nature) and artificial (those whereby man can supplement
nature) means of conserving life. Both, however, can be ordinary
means.
3. "Ordinary means of conserving life" and "ordinary medical procedures" must be distinguished. What is an ordinary medical procedure may not be an ordinary means of conserving life in the
theological sense.
4. A relative norm suffices for determining ordinary and extraordinary means. (There is no absolute norm.) 11
Before presenting Cronin's definitions of ordinary and extraordinary means and how these should be employed, it would be helpful to
point out that Cronin includes in his analysis the original work of the
American moralist Gerald Kelly, S.J. In an article in Theological
Studies written in 1950,12 Kelly discusses the duty of using artificial
means of preserving life and comes to the conclusion that "even ordiAugust, 1980
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nary artificial means are not obligatory when relatively useless. "13 In
a later article, 14 he modifies this position by considering the concept
of uselessness as indicative of extraordinary means. 15
Cronin, following Kelly, gives the following definitions :
Ordinary means of co nserving life may be defined as those m ea ns com·
monly used in given circumstances, which this individual in his present
physical, psychologica l, a nd economic condition can reasonably employ
with definite hope of proportionate b e nefit.
Extraordinary means of conserving life may b e defined as those means
not co mmonly used in given circumstances, or those m ea ns in common use
which this individual in his present physical , psychological, and economic
condition cannot reasonably employ , or, if he can, will not give him definite
hope of proportionate ben efit. 16

He then points out that while ordinary means as defined are always
morally obligatory, extraordinary means are not per se but only per
accidens, i.e., a particular individual may be bound in some extenuating circumstances (e.g. , for the common good) to employ such
means. 17
In closing this section I should like to present three final points.
The first is mentioned by Joseph V. Sullivan 18 and the last two by
Gerald Kelly. Sullivan points out that ordinary and extraordinary
means are relative also to the patient's physical condition. Thus, "a
natural means of prolonging life is, per se, an ordinary means of prolonging life, yet per accidens, it may be extraordinary," and "an artificial means of prolonging life may be an ordinary means or an extraordinary means relative to the physical condition of the patient." 19
Kelly mentions two other aspects worthy of note. First, he introduces the principle of totality into the discussion and maintains that
perhaps we should consider the patient's total condition before we
decide whether a given means is ordinary or extraordinary. Thus, for
example, he sees the possibility of a diabetic with terminal cancer not
taking insulin as perhaps an extraordinary means. 20 He also emphasizes that we must consider the rights and duties of relatives and
physicians when evaluating whether a given means of conserving life is
ordinary or extraordinary. This idea, presented in rudimentary form
by Kelly, 21 is clearly explicated by Pope Pius XII as we shall soon see.

The Allocution of Pope Pius XII to Physicians and Anesthesiologists
and the Response of Catholic Moral Theologians
On Nov. 24, 1957, addressing an international congress of physicians and anesthesiologists, Pius XII explicated the papal magisterial
teaching with regard to the prolongation of life. Following Huftier, 22
the teaching can be broken down into the principle and its
application.
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Principle:

·.

Natural reason and Christian morals say that man (and whoever is
entrusted with taking care of his fellowman) has the right and the duty in
case of serious illness to take the necessary treatment for the preservation of
life and health . This duty that one has toward himself, toward God, toward
the human community, and in most cases toward certain determined per·
sons, derives from well-ordered charity, from submission to the Creator,
from social justice and even from strict justice, as well as from devotion
toward one's family.
But normally one is held to use only ordinary means - according to the
circumstances of persons, places, times, and culture - that is to say, means
that do not involve any grave burden (aucune charge extraordinaire) for
oneself or another. A more strict obligation would be too burdensome (trop
lourde) for most men and would render the attainment of the higher, more
important good too difficult. Life, health, all temporal activities are in fact
subordinated to spiritual ends. On the other hand , one is not forbidden to
take more than the strictly necessary steps to preserve life and health , as
long as he does not fail in some more serious duty. "

Application:
The rights and duties of the doctor are correlative to those of the patient.
The doctor, in fact , has no separate or independent right where the patient
is concerned. In general he can take action only if the patient explicitly or
implicitly, directly or indirectly, gives him permission. The technique of
resuscitation which concerns us here does not contain anything immoral in
itself. Therefore the patient, if he were capable of making a personal decision, could lawfully use it and, consequently, give the doctor permission to
use it. On the other hand, since these forms of treatment go beyond the
ordinary means to which one is bound , it cannot be held that there is an
obligation to use them nor, consequently, that one is bound to give the
doctor permission to use them.
The rights and duties of the family depend in general upon the presumed
will of the unconscious patient if he is of age and "sui juris. " Where the
proper and independent duty of the family is concerned, they are usually
bound only to the use of ordinary means.
Consequently, if it appears that the attempt at resuscitation constitutes
in reality such a burden (une telle charge) for the family that one cannot in
all conscience impose it upon them, they can lawfully insist that the doctor
should discontinue these attempts, and the doctor can lawfully comply.
There is not involved here a case of the direct disposal of the life of the
patient, nor of euthanasia in any way; this would never be licit. Even when
it causes the arrest of circulation, the interruption of attempts at resuscitation is never more than an indirect cause of the cessation of life, and one
must apply in this case the principle of double effect and of "uoluntarium in
causa. " 23

One of the first theologians to respond to this teaching was Eugene
Tesson. In a brief articles in Etudes,24 he outlines the papal teaching,
emphasizes the importance this decree gives to families of an unconscious patient, and concludes by showing the value of casuistry in
determining what treatment should or should not be accorded in given
situations and circumstances. In a much longer article by Michel
Riquet in Cahiers Laennec, 25 the papal teaching and its implications
August, 1980
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are thoroughly analyzed. The author especially emphasizes the importance of the principle of totality (extended to the psychological and
spiritual dimensions of the whole person) and shows how this principle can enter the calculus of determination of extraordinary and
ordinary means. 26 He also shows the importance of consequences as
implied by this doctrine, emphasizing that if one would consider
oneself a grave burden to oneself or to others by undergoing a surgical
or medical procedure, one would not be obliged to undergo it.27 He
concludes by stressing the complexity of most medical-moral decisions, and points out how many different factors have to be considered before a really informed and prudent judgment can be made in
any given case. 28
Marc Oraison discusses the papal decree in a different context, that
of the allocation of scarce lifegiving resources, in an article written in
1963. 29 He raises the question whether, in a hospital equipped with
six artificial respiration units all being used - some by persons in deep
coma - a person with polio who needed one of these machines to stay
alive would have more of a right to its use than would someone in
deep coma who was already using it. He maintains that the Pope
would affirm that the person who has the greatest hope of survival is
entitled to the machinery, and that there is no moral difference
between not using extraordinary means in the first place and ceasing
their use once treatment has begun. 30
D. F. O'Callaghan, responding to a letter in the Irish Ecclesiastical
Record,31 points out that it is much more difficult to differentiate
between euthanasia and the cessation of extraordinary means than the
papal teaching seems to indicate, at least for the ordinary Christian.
Thus the problem of scandal must be dealt with. The author feels that
the best way to do this is to have public policy guidelines such as have
been issued in some homes for the incurably ill.32 In general, this
article is much more conservative in tone than any other considered
thus far.
In the journal Ami du Clerge, M. Huftier discusses the papal teaching in two different articles. 33 The latter article deals with the whole
papal allocution and merely paraphrases and explains it. The first
article, however, deals specifically with the ordinary and extraordinary
means of preserving life and the author uses the papal document to
support his own view. He contends that extraordinary means may be
understood thus: A significant mutilation (whose significance comes
from the extent or the function of the organ removed), or a serious
surgical operation involving great expense or some danger, or some
treatment demanding the use of a battery of complex techniques or
the maintenance of extensive care. 34 He concludes the article by
emphasizing that two points must not be forgotten:
1. If someone doesn't have exact foreknowledge with mathematical

certainty what will be the outcome, he should allow an ex per-
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ienced doctor to make the judgment. The doctor will at least
have the technical expertise needed to make such a jUdgment.
2. It is not forbidden to do more than that which is strictly necessary to conserve life and health, as long as one does not fail in
some more serious duty. 35
Aidan M. Carr discusses the topic in response to a question in the
November, 1973 issue of the Homiletic and Pastoral Review. 36 While
he does not directly quote the papal teaching, he uses the very words
of the Pope in formulating his reply. He also includes a very interesting analysis provided him by the Catholic moralist Thomas J.
O'Donnell. With regard to the prolongation of life in terminal illness,
O'Donnell states:
1. First, there is the means in itself - the extraordinary sophistication of
the means, the cost in money, in pain, in emotional stress, etc., in
using them.
2. Second, there is the idea of therapy as something that cures or at least
relieves. When a procedure ceases to do this, it ceases to be therapy.
3. Third, and particularly in view of the advances in modern techniques,
there's the impossibility of putting "extraordinary means" on one
shelf and "ordinary" on another. Rather, it seems to me, we must
speak of relatively ordinary or relatively extraordinary , i.e., relative to
what is left of the usable context of human living for this patient; relative to what the specific means in question can accomplish; relative to
the attitude and condition of the particular patient. 37

A final reference should be made to the very thorough treatment of
the issue found in Charles J. McFadden's sixth edition of his book,
Medical Ethics. 38 (This approach is presented substantially unchanged
in the author's latest book, The Dignity of Life. 39) While the author
does not directly include the papal teaching in either book, his presentation is consonant with it, and its significance lies in the fact that
it provides clear-cut examples for almost every type of situation which
can be conceived in the light of the traditional teaching. He also makes
reference to other articles on the subject which have not been
included here.

Discussion
As was mentioned earlier, the Karen Quinlan case has stimulated a
renewed discussion of the issue of ordinary versus extraordinary
means of preserving life. It has been my intention in this paper to
show the evolution of this teaching in Catholic moral theology up to
early 1974 when the Quinlan case began to exert its -influence upon
ethicists and theologians of the present time. In this final section, I
would like to raise some points of discussion based upon the presentation in the previous two sections.
August, 1980
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In the first place, it was pointed out that Cronin makes a distinction
between natural and artificial means and shows that both can be considered ordinary in some circumstances. Sullivan then claims that even
natural means can be considered extraordinary since means are always
to be considered relative to a patient's physical condition. This seems
to indicate that providing adequate nutrition and protection from
infection need not be absolutely necessary if the patient's physical
condition doesn't warrant it. I believe that even the papal teaching is
ambiguous on this point, for while it stresses on the one hand that one
must always take the necessary measures to preserve life and health
(indicating that natural means are always considered ordinary), it also
states that one is not obliged to make oneself a burden to oneself or to
others (indicating a much greater relativity of determining means).
Secondly, it would seem that neither the European theologians nor
the Pope himself adopt Kelly's utilitarian proviso that means used
"without reasonable hope of success" are to be considered extraordinary. This pragmatic approach, while not contradicted by anyone,
seems to be totally ignored by almost all the European authors, with
the exception of Oraison, who does not explicitly state the principle
but uses it implicitly in the case he presents, and feels that this
approach is consonant with the papal teaching. American and Irish
moralists, however, are comfortable with this approach both before
and after the papal teaching which would indicate that they feel that
the Pope had not, in fact, rejected it. The question I would raise, tying
this point to the previous one, is this: Could one ever in the case of
terminal illness, even though someone were not a grave burden, discontinue feeding him because there was not a "reasonable hope of
success" if he were fed normally? While most would consider this to
be active euthanasia, it would seem possible to accept it within traditional Catholic thought, i.e., if natural means can sometimes be extraordinary, and extraordinary means are determined at times by
usefulness, why not discontinue natural means if they are useless?
The third and final point is that raised by O'Callaghan who pointed
out that it is hard at times to distinguish between euthanasia and the
withdrawal of extraordinary means. This is especially true today when
many times passive euthanasia is defined as the withdrawal of exotic
life support systems for a given patient. It seems that because of the
emotional overtones connected with the word, Church leaders are
afraid to admit that Catholic moral theology has always allowed
"passive euthanasia" as it is defined today, and are thus unspportive of
legislation allowing precisely this in certain parts of the United States
at the present time. It would be helpful to reflect upon the teaching of
Catholic moral theology in this regard before pastoral letters are
written which confuse people as much as they direct and guide them.
Hopefully this presentation has brought into clearer focus some of
the issues involved in the means used for the prolonging of human life
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today. While we must not become slaves to the past, we must understand former approaches if we are to formulate teaching that is in
harmony with our tradition, yet responsive to the needs and problems
of our times.
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ARE YOU AN ARTIST?
The American Physicians' Art Association, an organization now in its
43rd year, meets annually with the Southern Medical Association and
presents its yearly exhibit. The AP AA has nearly 500 members across
the country.
In 1980 the SMA meets in San Antonio, Texas, from November
16-19.
All physicians who work in the fields of painting, sculpture, photog·
raphy, graphic arts, design and creative crafts are encouraged to join the
APAA to submit entries for the November exhibit.
The annual exhibit is always of top rank quality with professional
arranging and hanging of the art works. Qualified judges each year
award prizes in the following categories: oil and acrylics (classical and
modern), water color, sculpture, arts and crafts, photography and
graphics. Each category has a first, second and third prize. In addition,
special masters awards, honorable mention, and best of show are also
given. There is consideration for advanced and beginning artists.
Membership is open to all physicians. Southern Medical Association
membership is not required. Those interested should write to :
Milton S. Good, M.D.
Treasurer, APAA
610 Highland Avenue
Elizabethtown, PA 17022
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